Federal-State-Local Relationships in Transporting Radioactive Materials: Rules of the Nuclear Road by Trosten, Leonard M. & Ancarrow, M. Reamy
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 68 | Issue 2 Article 2
1979
Federal-State-Local Relationships in Transporting
Radioactive Materials: Rules of the Nuclear Road
Leonard M. Trosten
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & McRae
M. Reamy Ancarrow
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & McRae
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Transportation Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Trosten, Leonard M. and Ancarrow, M. Reamy (1979) "Federal-State-Local Relationships in Transporting Radioactive Materials:
Rules of the Nuclear Road," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 68 : Iss. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol68/iss2/2
Federal- State-Local Relationships in
Transporting Radioactive Materials:
Rules of the Nuclear Road
By LEONARD M. TROSTEN* AND M. REAMY ANcARRow**
INTRODUCTION
The transport of "hazardous" materials' has generated in-
creasing concern over the risks presented to both transporta-
tion workers and the public. At the same time, it is recognized
that modern society depends on the ready availability of these
materials for industrial, commercial and consumer use. Thus
emerges the familiar clash between society's desire to reap the
benefits of technology and the understandable concern over
the risks such usage entails.
Like other activities that entail this conflict, such as dis-
charge of industrial materials into the environment and solid
waste disposal, transportation of hazardous materials features
extremely complex governmental regulatory structures. In ad-
dition to the federal government and the state governments,
political subsectors such as counties and municipalities have
embellished the regulatory labyrinth. This article examines
the dynamics among these three levels of government in light
of their respective efforts to regulate the transportation of a
particular category of hazardous substances: radioactive
materials. 2
The debate concerning the legality and propriety of fed-
* Partner in the firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae in Washington, D.C.
A.B. 1953, LL.B. 1955, Columbia University. Mr. Trosten was Staff Counsel to the
Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy (1965-1967) and an attorney in the
Office of the General Counsel of the Atomic Energy Commission (1958-1964). He is
admitted to the bars of New York and the District of Columbia.
** Attorney in the firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae in Washington, D.C.
A.B. 1973, J.D. 1976, University of Virginia. Ms. Ancarrow is admitted to the bars of
the District of Columbia and Virginia.
I Examples of hazardous materials include solid wastes from industrial activities,
fuels such as liquified natural gas, toxic chemicals and radioactive materials.
2 Regulatory issues in this area include packaging, preparation for shipment, and
carriage of the materials.
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eral, state and local controls over transportation of radioactive
materials revolves around certain key regulatory actions by
states and localities. These actions include: outright bans on
transportation of radioactive materials through certain areas;
special transportation requirements, such as time-of-day re-
strictions, escort requirements and special routing provisions;
and requirements for permits and notification prior to ship-
ment. Three central questions pervade these controversial ac-
tions: (1) What is an acceptable level of risk for society to as-
sume in permitting radioactive materials to be transported?
(2) Who should determine the acceptable level of risk? and (3)
How should the costs and benefits of transporting these mate-
rials be apportioned? These questions accentuate the dilemma
faced by legislators at each level of government.
This article explores existing constraints under the
supremacy clause of the Constitution on state and local regu-
lation of transportation of radioactive materials. Primary at-
tention will focus on highway transportation issues, since the
major intergovernmental conflicts occur with respect to this
transportation mode.3 Given the diverse nature of governmen-
tal structures affected and the tension between the need for
uniform national standards and the rights of states and locali-
ties to protect legitimate local interests, the regulation contro-
versy provides insight into the ability of governmental institu-
tions to function effectively with modern technology. The legal
principles examined in this article provide tools for simplify-
ing and harmonizing the roles of the various actors involved in
regulatory decisionmaking.
I. SOURCES OF FEDERAL AND STATE POWERS
Regulation of transportation activities historically has
been shared by the federal, state and local governments. State
and local entities, pursuant to their inherent police powers to
protect health and safety,4 traditionally have exercised broad
Much of the analysis applicable to highway transportation of radioactive mater-
ials is relevant to other transportation modes and other categories of hazardous
materials as well.
I See notes 171-73 infra and accompanying text for further discussion of the
states' police power.
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regulatory control in the area. The source of the federal gov-
ernment's regulatory power springs principally from the com-
merce clause of the United States Constitution,5 which oper-
ates not only as a grant to the federal government but also as
a restriction on state governmental activity. Even in the ab-
sence of an affirmative congressional exercise of this power,
the commerce clause prevents the states from erecting barriers
to the free flow of interstate commerce.6 Nevertheless, much
state legislation designed to serve legitimate state interests
and applied without discrimination against interstate com-
merce does not violate the commerce clause even though it af-
fects commerce.7
Underlying any state or local transportation regulation for
health or safety purposes is a fundamental conflict between
the state's. or locality's interest in the exercise of its police
power and the federal interest in unencumbered free trade.
Resolving this conflict, in the absence of clear congressional
intent, presents a balancing task for the courts.' Courts must
weigh the two competing interests in delineating limitations
on a state's governmental powers.9
The constitutional inquiry is different where Congress
specifically has established a federal regulatory scheme, and
the question becomes whether there has been federal preemp-
tion of state or local regulation or whether state or local regu-
lation conflicts with federal law. The preemption doctrine has
its roots in the supremacy clause,'0 which elevates federal law
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 262 (1827). See also H.P. Hood and Sons, Inc. v.
Dumond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
1 See, e.g., Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911); Erb v.
Moracsh, 177 U.S. 584 (1900); Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 53
U.S. 143 (1851).
8 See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959); Southern Pa-
cific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945).
1 See A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976); H.P. Hood and Sons,
Inc. v. Dumond, 336 U.S. 525, 553 (1949).
" U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, which provides:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Con-
stitution of Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
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above that of the states. The tenth amendment, on the other
hand, recognizes that powers not delegated to the federal gov-
ernment by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the states
are reserved to the states."
A sound basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction does
not therefore of itself exclude the states from any control over
the subjects of such federal jurisdiction. 2 By virtue of their
residual powers states may regulate activities and objects that
are federally regulated, including articles moving or subject to
movement in interstate commerce, if those activities and ob-
jects do not by their nature demand a uniform national
scheme of regulation, 3 or to the extent that Congress has not
expressly or impliedly precluded state regulation.'4
The federal government has extensively regulated the
field of nuclear energy, including the transportation of nuclear
materials,' and states have also taken steps to control nuclear
energy operations."' Subsequent sections of this article will ex-
amine the interaction between the federal scheme and state
and local regulations.
II. FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE
The present federal regulatory structure controlling high-
way transportation of radioactive materials primarily involves
two agencies, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and
the Department of Transportation (DOT), with tangential
participation'by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).
An explanation of each of their regulatory schemes is essential
for consideration of their interrelation with state and local
regulations.
" U.S. CONST. amend. X.
2 See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945).
13 Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1983);
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1959).
" De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725
(1948); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941), and cases cited therein at 113-
14.
" See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976).
,6 See section II infra for discussion of regulatory schemes propounded by state
and local governments.
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A. Regulation of Radioactive Materials by the NRC
Almost from the inception of nuclear technology, a mo-
nopoly over its use, control and ownership was conferred on
the federal government by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.11
Control over and ownership of all nuclear production facilities
and of all fissionable material was placed in the Atomic En-
ergy Commission (AEC) as agent for the United States."8
Hence these materials were never, practically speaking, sub-
ject to state or local regulation." The Atomic Energy Act of
1954,0 however, relaxed somewhat the federal monopoly over
nuclear technology and permitted civilian ownership and use
of certain radioactive materials.
1. Atomic Energy Act of 1954
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 vested in the AEC (now
NRC) jurisdiction to license source," special" and by-prod-
uct23 nuclear materials when used for civilian purposes,u
" Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2296 (1976)).
"1 Pursuant to § 201(f) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §
5841 (1976), all regulatory authority of the AEC was transferred to the newly-created
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). References in this article are to the AEC for
periods when that agency was acting, and to the NRC for discussions of events after
January 19, 1975.
1, See generally Estep and Adelman, State Control of Radiation Hazards: An In-
tergovernmental Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. Rav. 41 (1961).
" Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2296 (1976)).
21 42 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2099 (1976). Source material is defined as "uranium, tho-
rium," or any other material determined to be so, or "ores containing one or more of
the foregoing materials" in concentrations determined by the Commission. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2014(z) (1976).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2064, 2071-2078 (1976). Special nuclear material is "(1) plu-
tonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235," or any other ma-
terial determined by the NRC to be so, except it does not include "source material."
42 U.S.C. § 2014(aa) (1976).
3 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2111-2114 (Supp. 1979). "By-product material" is "any radio-
active material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by
exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special nu-
clear material" and "the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or concentra-
tion of uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its source material
content." 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e) (1979). See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2140, for provisions
governing licenses for various activities and uses, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2210 for the
general authorizations of the agency.
2 The AEC was made responsible by § 2073(b) of the Act for all "distribution" of
1979 -80]
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whether or not they are part of interstate commerce. More-
over, the Act did not confer on the states any regulatory au-
thority over these materials. The NRC is authorized to regu-
late civilian nuclear. activities through an elaborate system of
licensing. The NRC's authority to regulate the packaging,
shipment and carriage of nuclear materials is inferred from
the authority granted the NRC over the transfer, delivery, re-
ceipt, acquisition, possession and use of source, by-product
and special nuclear materials, and production and utilization
facilities, whether or not in interstate commerce. 5
The importance Congress attached to the maintenance of
a comprehensive federal system of regulation and control is re-
vealed by policy statements in the 1954 Act. The legislation is
replete with statements concerning the need for regulation in
the national interest in order to provide for the common de-
fense and security and to protect the health and safety of the
special nuclear material, which may be conducted only pursuant to an AEC license
and in accordance with AEC safety standards for the protection of life, health, and
property under § 2073(e)(7). Moreover, under § 2077(a) no person may "receive,"
"possess" or "transfer" such material without an AEC license which may be granted
by the Commission in accordance with § 2073(a) in cases where qualified applicants,
desiring to put the material to approved uses, meet the defense, security, and health
and safety criteria established by the Commission. The statute gives the Commission
similar authority with respect to by-product material in § 2111; source material, in §§
2092, 2093(a), 2093(b), 2099; and production and utilization facilities, in §§ 2131,
2133. Moreover, the Commission is authorized by § 2201(b) to
establish by rule, regulation, or order, such standards and instructions to
govern the possession and use of special nuclear material, source material
and byproduct material as the Commission may deem necessary or desira-
ble to promote the common defense and security or to protect health or to
minimize danger to life or property. ...
42 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (1976); and by § 2201(i) to
prescribe such regulations or orders as it may deem necessary . . . (2) to
guard against the loss or diversion of any special nuclear material acquired
. . . or produced . . . [pursuant to provisions of the Act, and] to prevent
any use or disposition thereof which the Commission may determine to be
inimical to the common defense and security, . . . and (3) to govern any
activity authorized pursuant to this chapter, including standards and re-
strictions governing the design, location, and operation of facilities used in
the conduct of such activity, in order to protect health and to minimize
dangers to life or property.
42 U.S.C. § 2201(i) (1976).
"1 See note 24 supra for examples of the Commission's broad powers.
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public. 6 The intended breadth of the federal scheme is re-
vealed by the stated purpose of providing "a program for Gov-
ernment control of the possession, use, and production of
atomic energy and special nuclear material, whether owned by
the Government or others. ... 21
2. Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act
In 1959 Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act by ad-
ding section 274,2 which was designed, inter alia, to clarify the
respective responsibilities of the federal government and the
states with regard to the control and use of source, by-product
and special nuclear material.2' Section 274 established proce-
dures and criteria for the "discontinuance"3 by the NRC and
the "assumption" by the states, through an agreement with
the NRC,3' of certain regulatory responsibilities otherwise
within the exclusive domain of the NRC.
There is little doubt that Congress intended section 274 to
confirm a general federal preemption of the regulation of nu-
clear activities. 2 Although section 274 is phrased as though
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011, 2012(e), 2013(c)(d) (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 2013(c) (1976). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2012 (1976).
Act of September 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 1, 73 Stat. 688, (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2021 (1976)).
42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(1) (1976).
" Id. § 2021(a)(4).
31 Id. § 2021(b)(1976) (amended 1978).
32 The thrust of the legislative history of § 274 is that the congressional purpose
was to provide a mechanism by which the states may assume responsibilities that are
otherwise exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Commission.
In favorably reporting the bill that became § 274, the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy observed that "the Commission now regulates and licenses the materials cov-
ered by the Atomic Energy Act (by-product, source, and special nuclear material) to
protect against radiation hazards." H.R. REP. No. 1125, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959);
and declared that, under the bill, "the Commission has exclusive authority to regu-
late for protection against radiation hazards until such time as the State enters into
an agreement with the Commission to assume such responsibility." H. R. REP. No.
1125, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1959).
In presenting the bill on the floor of the Senate, Senator Anderson, the Joint
Committee's Chairman and Senate sponsor of the bill, spoke in the same vein and
explained:
At the present time, the Federal Government has exclusive responsibility
for the licensing and basic regulation of these materials, although States
may require registration and inspection. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is
silent as to the regulatory role of the States; and if this silence is allowed to
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the NRC has exclusive jurisdiction over all aspects of such
regulation, the NRC does not enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over
the transportation of radioactive materials in the federal area
but shares some authority with the DOT. The DOT's author-
ity will be examined in a subsequent section of this article.3
With respect to the states, there is much support in the
Atomic Energy Act for the proposition that Congress did not
intend concurrent exercise of jurisdiction over source, by-prod-
uct and special nuclear material regulated by the federal gov-
ernment. 34 Instead, the federal government or the state gov-
ernment, but not both, would exercise regulatory authority.
For example, under section 274 a state may not regulate cer-
tain radioactive materials or activities for protection against
radiation hazards except as provided in an agreement between
the state and the NRC.3 The NRC would surrender active reg-
continue, I believe that there will be confusion and possible conflict between
Federal and State regulations and uncertainty on the part of the industry
and possible jeopardy to the public health and safety.
105 CONG. REc. 19042 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Anderson). See also 105 CONG. REc.
19171 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Van Zandt).
The Joint Committee hearings on the legislation provide further support for this
viewpoint, The testimony which had been drafted and submitted by AEC is especially
noteworthy. See Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, on Federal-
State Relationships in the Atomic Energy Field, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 287-316 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]. See also Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 477
F.2d 1143, 1148-49 (8th Cir. 1971).
1 See section H-B infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the DOT's
authority.
U The Joint Committee report on the legislation stated:
It is not intended to leave any room for the exercise of dual or concurrent
jurisdiction by States to control radiation hazards by regulating byproduct,
source, or special nuclear materials. The intent is to have the material regu-
lated and licensed either by the Commission, or by the State and local gov-
ernments, but not by both. The bill is intended to encourage States to in-
crease their knowledge and capacities, and to enter into agreements to
assume regulatory responsibilities over such materials.
H. R. REP. No. 1125, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1959).
See also Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1149-50 (8th
Cir. 1971). This philosophy has been more recently observed in United States v. New
York, 463 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) and Pacific Legal Foundation v. California
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, 472 F. Supp. 191
(S.D. Cal. 1979). These cases are discussed further infra at text accompanying notes
200-14.
1 In the Joint Committee's original draft, fhe bill contained in subsection (k) an
express statement that any state regulation of radiation hazards from such materials
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ulation of those items upon the execution of such an agree-
ment, but in the absence of an agreement the regulation
would remain exclusively within the jurisdiction of the NRC.
The purpose of section 274 is to provide a framework
within which, pursuant to a section 274 agreement with the
NRC, states may assume the regulation of areas occupied by
the NRC. The state scheme must operate on the basis of com-
patibility between the state regulatory programs and those of
the NRC, which the state programs are intended to replace.36
Some portions of the NRC's authority, however, cannot be
transferred to the states. The extent to which any state may
be conferred general authority to regulate the packaging, ship-
ment and carriage of radioactive materials passing through its
territory is explicitly addressed in section 274. State regulation
of special nuclear material sufficient to form a "critical mass"
for radiological safety purposes is specifically prohibited."
State regulation of source, by-product or special nuclear mate-
rial for protection of the common defense and security, or to
guard against diversion, also is prohibited." Most important
for present purposes, state regulation of production and utili-
zation facilities is not permitted in a section 274 agreement. 9
During the hearings conducted prior to the passage of sec-
would be inapplicable in the absence of an AEC agreement. S. 2568, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 274(k)(1959). Although that language was eventually deleted, the Joint Com-
mittee explained that the deletion of the sentence made no essential difference in the
bill: 0
Amendment 6 deletes the first sentence of subsection k, as unnecessary
.... [T]he Commission now regulates and licenses the materials covered
by the Atomic Energy Act (byproduct, source and special nuclear materials)
to protect against radiation hazards. With or without this sentence, in order
for a State to so regulate or license such materials, it must first establish an
adequate program for this purpose and enter into an agreement with the
Commission.
H. R. REP. No. 1125, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959). It appears that the Joint Commit-
tee excised the language in deference to the AEC position that the exclusion of the
sentence would somehow give courts a little more leeway for upholding local statutes,
such as zoning laws that might incidentally affect the use of atomic materials by AEC
licenses, in the absence of a state agreement with the AEC. See Hearings, supra note
32, at 488-96, 500.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(d)(2) (Supp. 1979). See Hearings, supra note 32, at 290.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(b)(3) (Supp. 1979).
See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2021(b) and (m) (1973 & Supp. 1979).
' 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(c)(1) (1973 & Supp. 1979).
1979-80]
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tion 274, AEC witnesses stated that the purpose of the section
was to authorize the Commission to relinquish to the states
control over radiation hazards similar to those already regu-
lated by the states, such as the hazards from x-ray machines,
and those that involve only small quantities of materials or
qualities of hazards. 0 It was pointed out that many NRC
regulatory activities involve large quantities of materials and
intense radioactivity and require complex control measures.'
The legislative history appears explicit as to regulatory
authority over transportation of nuclear fuel. Such transporta-
tion was to remain exclusively with the NRC and could be
viewed as being within the prohibition of section 274(c)(1) .12
The NRC's jurisdiction with respect to transportation activi-
ties was seen as excluded from the areas relinquishable to the
states and thus reserved for the federal government. 3 The ar-
eas so reserved "include the construction and operation of nu-
clear reactors, together with related transportation and han-
dling of nuclear fuel. . . ."" The AEC's section-by-section
analysis of section 274 in bill form also spoke of excluded areas
where national considerations are paramount or where safety
considerations are so complex that states would be unprepared
to handle them in the foreseeable future."5 In addition, there
was testimony from the AEC to the following effect:
Under the licenses which we issue for the operation of nu-
clear reactors, we would have control over the shipment of
" Hearings, supra note 32, at 290, 291. In addition, the Joint Committee report
stated that § 274
applies to some, but not all, atomic energy activities now regulated exclu-
sively by AEC. It applies principally to radioisotopes, whose use and pre-
sent licensing by AEC is widespread, but whose hazard is local and lim-
ited. . . .Licensing and regulation of more dangerous activities-such as
nuclear reactors- will remain the exclusive responsibility of the Commis-
sion. Thus a line is drawn between types of activities deemed appropriate
for regulation by individual States at this time and other activities where
continued AEC regulation is necessary.
H.R. REP. No. 1125, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1959)(emphasis supplied). See also
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1151 (8th Cir. 1971).
11 See Hearings, supra note 32, at 291.
42 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(c)(1) (1973 & Supp. 1979).
11 See Hearings, supra note 32, at 291.
I Id.
Id. at 294.
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any irradiated fuel elements from the facility to a chemical
reprocessing plant under this bill. There are not any licensed
chemical reprocessing plants. They would fall in the same
category as reactors under this bill, so we would continue our
regulatory controls over the reprocessing plant and shipment
of the high level waste products from that plant. (Emphasis
supplied.)46
Since the addition of section 274 to the Act in 1959, the
Commission has promulgated regulations concerning exemp-
tions from state jurisdiction and continued federal regulatory
authority in agreement states.47 Those regulations provide that
persons in agreement states are not exempt from the NRC's
licensing and regulatory authority with respect to, inter alia,
"[t]he construction and operation of any production or utiliza-
tion facility"4 and the "transfer, storage or disposal of radio-
active waste material resulting from the separation in a pro-
duction facility of special nuclear material from irradiated
nuclear reactor fuel."49 In addition, the NRC has published
criteria to be followed by the states in developing programs for
the assumption of regulatory authority under section 274
agreements. 0
The state shall to the extent of its jurisdiction promulgate
regulations applicable to the shipment of radioactive materi-
als, such regulations to be compatible with those established
by the Federal Government (AEC, Interstate Commerce
Commission, Federal Aviation Agency, Treasury Depart-
ment (Coast Guard), and Post Office), whose jurisdiction
over interstate shipment of such materials continues."'
The required state regulation would apply to all ship-
" Id. at 306.
,' 10 C.F.R. §§ 150.1-.30 (1979).
10 C.F.R. § 150.15(a)(1) (1979).
" 10 C.F.R. § 150.15(a)(4)(1979). In addition, § 150.15(b) provides that,
the Commission may from time to time by rule, regulation, or order, require
that the manufacturer, processor, or producer of any ... product contain-
ing source, byproduct or special nuclear material shall not transfer posses-
sion or control of such product except pursuant to a license or exemption
from licensing issued by the Commission.
o 26 Fed. Reg. 2536 (1961) as amended, 30 Fed. Reg. 15,044 (1965). See 1 Nuc.
REG. REP. 1 19,101.
"1 1 Nuc. REG. REP. 10.
1979-801
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ments of radioactive materials within the jurisdictional control
of the state, presumably including those that are intrastate as
well as those that are interstate. Most important, however, is
that such regulation is subject to the same compatibility re-
quirement as are all other state radiation regulations. The im-
plication is that state regulation of shipment, carriage and
packaging of source, by-product and special nuclear materials
is treated equivalently with state regulation of all other as-
pects of the use and handling of such materials under section
274 of the Act. In other words, no state may regulate the ship-
ment, carriage or packaging of source, by-product or special
nuclear materials for radiation protection purposes other than
pursuant to an agreement with the NRC under section 274,
and state regulations, to the extent they are applicable, must
be compatible with the federal regulations they replace or
supplement.
NRC transport regulations illustrate generally the type of
requirements with which state regulation, to the extent it may
be exercised, must comply.2 Until recently, the NRC had ex-
empted common carriers of radioactive materials from ob-
taining a license to carry such materials. 3 Instead, the NRC
chose the alternative of requiring those entities licensed by the
NRC (i.e., shippers, private carriers and manufacturers) to
conform to NRC packaging, marking and shipping criteria.
Recent amendments to the transport regulations now subject
common carriers of certain classes of radioactive materials
(i.e., formula quantities of strategic special nuclear materials)
to physical protection requirements during transport. 4 The
NRC also has promulgated an "interim" regulation governing
spent nuclear fuel in transit that imposes a range of require-
ments, including prenotification and routing requirements on
shippers.5 More recently, compliance with applicable regula-
tions of the DOT and other federal agencies also is required by
52 The NRC has issued extensive regulations implementing a major portion of its
licensing authority over radioactive materials. See generally 10 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 73
(1979).
See 10 C.F.R. § 30.13 (1979) (by-product); § 40.12 (1979) (source material) and
§ 70.12 (1979) (special nuclear material).
' See 10 C.F.R. § 71.5 (1979).
10 C.F.R. §§ 73.1-73.72, and Part 73 App. C (1979).
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the NRC. 6
B. Regulation of Transportation by DOT
Analysis relating to transportation of radioactive materi-
als differs from other aspects of their use and handling be-
cause Congress has not delegated exclusive regulatory author-
ity to the NRC. Concurrent federal authority over radioactive
materials transport has existed with several other regulatory
bodies for quite some time, with primary responsibility now
focused in the DOT.
1. Historical Development of Regulatory Authority
The Transportation of Explosives and Dangerous Articles
Act of 190711 (TEA) originally vested in the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) authority to
formulate regulations for the safe transportation within the
United States of explosives and other dangerous articles, in-
cluding radioactive materials . . .which shall be binding
upon all carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce
which transport explosives or other dangerous articles by
land, and upon all shippers making shipments of explosives
and other dangerous articles via any carrier engaged in inter-
state or foreign commerce by land or water.',
The ICC also administered the Motor Carrier Act of 195311
and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966.0 The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations" com-
prised the bulk of transport operation safety regulations for
motor carriers, including those carrying hazardous materials.
The Dangerous Cargo Act62 authorized the United States
Coast Guard to exercise jurisdiction over carriers of hazardous
materials, including by implication radioactive materials, by
water. Each of these regulatory bodies thus possessed some ju-
,, 10 C.F.R. § 71.5 (1979).
18 U.S.C. §§ 831-836 (1976).
18 U.S.C. § 834(a) (1976)(emphasis added).
' 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101-11916 (Supp. 1979).
s 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1976).
" 49 C.F.R. Parts 390-397 (1979).
82 46 U.S.C. § 170 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
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risdiction, overlapping that of the AEC, over the transporta-
tion of radioactive materials. Although concurrent jurisdiction
existed, interagency cooperation was in some instances statu-
torily mandated. Section 834(b) of the TEA, for example, re-
quired the ICC (and now the DOT) to "advise and consult"
with the NRC "[b]efore adopting any regulations relating to
radioactive materials .... ,,63
In 1976 the DOT was created as a new cabinet depart-
ment to consolidate and coordinate regulation of the ranges
and modes of transportation. 4 The new department received
the authority formerly held by the ICC under the TEA, in-
cluding control over radioactive materials.65 The Coast Guard,
previously an independent unit, was reclassified as within the
DOT, thus implicitly transferring authority under the Danger-
ous Cargo Act to the DOT.66
2. Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
In order to consolidate, clarify and strengthen the regula-
tory authority of the DOT in the field of hazardous materials,
Congress enacted the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
(HMTA)67 as Title I of the Transportation Safety Act of 1974.
The HMTA vested in the Secretary of the DOT or his delegate
the authority to promulgate and enforce uniform hazardous
materials regulations for all modes of transportation. Section
104 of the Act permits the Secretary to designate particular
substances as "hazardous," and specifically names radioactive
materials as includible within the designation of hazardous
materials.68 Section 105 of the HMTA authorizes the Secretary
to issue regulations for the "safe transportation in com-
merce"69 of "hazardous materials," including requirements for
18 U.S.C. § 834(b)(1976).
U The Act was "to retain intact the authority over Hazardous Materials Trans-
portation" that previously existed. H.R. REP. No. 93-1083, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CONG. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS, 76, 79-80.
49 U.S.C. § 1655(e)(4) (1976).
" 49 U.S.C. § 1655(b)(1) (1976).
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, Pub. L. 93-63, 88 Stat. 2156-64 (codi-
fied 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (1976)).
- 49 U.S.C. § 1803 (1976).
69 "Commerce" is defined in the Act as "trade, traffic, commerce or transporta-
[Vol. 68
1979-801 TRANSPORTING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
packaging and handling.0
Within the DOT are a number of subdivisions which im-
plement the HMTA. The Materials Transportation Bureau
(MTB) acts as the primary policy-maker governing all modes
of hazardous materials transport and exercises compliance and
enforcement control. Coordinating with the MTB are the vari-
ous modal administrations. The Coast Guard supervises trans-
port in U.S. navigable waters and port areas; the Federal Rail-
road Administration ensures safe movement by railroad; the
Federal Highway Administration carries out the HMTA mat-
ters of highway safety, and the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion implements the provisions of the HMTA with regard to
air transport of radioactive materials in domestic and interna-
tional shipments." A major function of the HMTA was to
unify the disparate modal operations under earlier transport
laws." Therefore, one of the most important actions taken by
the MTB since its establishment was its repromulgation and
codification under the HMTA of the many regulations previ-
ously promulgated and enforced by the various modal
administrations.3
tion, within the jurisdiction of the United States, (A) between a place in a State and
any place outside of such State, or (B) which affects trade, traffic, commerce or trans-
portation described in clause (A)." 49 U.S.C. § 1802(1) (1976).
11 49 U.S.C. § 1804 (1976). The HMTA expanded the DOT's regulation of hazard-
ous materials in this regard by placing within its scope authority over manufacturers
and packagers, in addition to carriers and shippers.
1, The Federal Aviation Administration within the DOT, and the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board, an independent agency, both govern air transport at the federal level. A
recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, however,
ruled that the FAA rather than the CAB is charged with primary responsibility for
determining the safety of air transport of hazardous materials. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
C.A.B., 543 F.2d 247, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The role of the CAB, on the other hand, is
to enforce "the economic provisions of the [Federal Aviation] Act." Id. Thus the DOT
is the entity to which to look for substantive regulation of radioactive materials trans-
port by air. It might be noted that to a limited degree the HMTA addresses this mode
directly and declares that the Secretary must promulgate regulations prohibiting
transport of radioactive materials on passenger-carrying aircraft, with the exception of
materials used for "research, or medical diagnosis or treatment. 49 U.S.C. §
1807(a) (1976).
See S. REP. No. 93-1192, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974).
49 C.F.R. §§ 171.1-179.500-18 (1978). Preexisting rules governing highway
transportation of hazardous materials were not entirely readopted under the HMTA,
and remain enforceable under § 834 of the TEA. The implications of this enforceabil-
ity will be explored infra.
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3. Federal-State Relations Under the HMTA
While the Atomic Energy Act addresses federal-state reg-
ulatory relationships without employing the term "preemp-
tion," section 112 of the HMTA4 expressly declares:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
any requirement, of a State or political subdivision thereof,
which is inconsistent with any requirement set forth in this
chapter, or in a regulation issued under this chapter, is
preempted.
(b) Any requirement, of a State or political subdivision
thereof, which is not consistent with any requirement set
forth in this chapter, or in a regulation issued under this
chapter, is not preempted if, upon the application of an ap-
propriate State agency, the Secretary determines, in accor-
dance with procedures to be prescribed by regulation, that
such requirement (1) affords an equal or greater level of pro-
tection to the public than is afforded by the requirement of
this chapter or of regulations issued under this chapter and
(2) does not unreasonably burden commerce .... 11
Section 112 mandates that all "inconsistent" state and lo-
cal regulations are to be preempted, unless a state or locality
can demonstrate that adequate protection is afforded to the
public and that no unreasonable burden on commerce is im-
posed. This language implies that a less stringent state or lo-
cal rule, as well as a more stringent one, could be deemed "in-
consistent," and would seem to support a construction that
any state or local standard varying from the federal standards
would be "inconsistent."7 In summary, the HMTA envisions
11 49 U.S.C. § 1811(1976).
75Id.
71 The legislative history of § 112 soundly reinforces this construction. A specific
statement of congressional intent with respect to the operation of § 112 is absent from
the conference report on the HMTA. Since the original House bill did not contain a
preemption provision, the most cogent analysis of congressional intent is found in the
Senate Report that accompanied the Senate version of the bill, in which reference is
made to § 112:
The Committee endorses the principle of Federal preemption in order
to preclude a multiplicity of State and local regulations and the potential
for varying as well as conflicting regulations in the area of hazardous mater-
ials transportation. However, the Committee is aware that certain excep-
tional circumstances may necessitate immediate action to secure more
[Vol. 68
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a somewhat overlapping role for regulation between federal
and state authorities, circumscribed by a firm outer-limit on
the states in the requirements of consistency, public protec-
tion at least equal to that afforded by federal law and the
traditional burden on commerce stricture.77
4. Dual Jurisdiction of DOT and NRC: Memorandum of
Understanding
Because of the dual regulatory jurisdiction exercised by
the DOT and the NRC over shippers, carriers and others in-
volved in the transportation of radioactive materials, the two
agencies in 1973 executed a Memorandum of Understanding
which designated the areas in which each was to be responsi-
ble and defined those responsibilities. 8 A new Memorandum
stringent regulations. For the purpose of meeting such emergency situa-
tions, the Committee has provided that any State or political subdivision
may request, and the Secretary may grant, approval of regulations which
vary from Federal regulations, provided that they are equivalent or more
stringent and place no burden on interstate commerce.
S. REP. No. 93-1192, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 38 (1974)(emphasis added). It is apparent
that § 112 was intended to leave to the states only a narrowly confined area over
which they might enact concurrent regulation of transportation of hazardous materi-
als. All varying regulations were to be deemed inconsistent. One would assume that
this proscription would focus upon regulations such as height and weight restrictions
of vehicles, time-of-day restrictions and similar quantitative requirements. A second
concept also embodied in § 112, however, is that of "conflict," and would appear to
embody the dual compliance test stated in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), i.e., whether compliance with both the state and federal
law is a physical impossibility. This test may somewhat overlap with the "variance"
concept. In addition, the "conflict" test encompasses the preemption doctrine that
state laws posing an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the HMTA, or
rules thereunder, likewise must fall. This test was formulated in Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1941) (state alien registration law preempted).
If a state law is found to vary or be in conflict under § 112, it is clear from the
legislative history that such a law would only be allowed to remain in effect in certain
exceptional circumstances in which emergency considerations justify such a waiver.
" The burden on commerce language of § 112, while apparently an unnecessary
restatement of the principle of constitutional invalidation, may have been included
because Congress vested in the Secretary the initial responsibility for ruling on chal-
lenged state laws, a role usually held by the courts.
,s MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION FOR REGULATION
OF SAFETY IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS UNDER THE JURISDICTION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, 38 Fed.
Reg. 8466 (1973).
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of Understanding has recently been executed,79 and as re-
flected in it the DOT exercises primary responsibility to de-
velop transport regulations for the safe shipment of radio-
active materials." Common and contract carriers, freight
forwarders and warehousemen subject to the DOT regulations
are generally exempt from the NRC's regulations when trans-
porting, or storing as part of the transportation process, a
shipper's radioactive materials with the exception of "formula
quantities of strategic special nuclear material. 81 The DOT
standards are imposed on those shippers and private carriers
under NRC jurisdiction by its regulations82 requiring that its
"licensees and license-exempt contractors comply with the ap-
plicable requirements of DOT regulations when transporting
or shipping radioactive material, when those persons are not
otherwise subject to the provisions of DOT regulations.",,
The two agencies share responsibility for developing
safety standards for packaging materials. Design and perform-
ance standards for packaging fissile materials, 4 Type B mater-
ials" and large quantities of nuclear materials8 are approved
by the NRC. Package designs for all other categories of radio-
active materials are promulgated by the DOT.87
Although the NRC has allowed the DOT to take the
initiative in regulating carriers, the former agency has retained
11 TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOAcTIVE MATERIALS; MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING,
44 Fed. Reg. 38, 690 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING].
80 d.
S, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,850 (1979) (to be codified in 10 C.F.R. §§ 70.12 and 70.20a
effective June 7, 1979).
11 10 C.F.R. § 71.5 (1979). See generally Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Legis-
lation of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy on Proposed Budget of the Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission for Fiscal Year 1976, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 43-44 (1975)(questions
from Joint Committee answered by NRC).
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 79.
"'Fissile materials' means uranium 233, uranium 235, plutonium 238, pluto-
nium 239, and plutonium 241." 10 C.F.R. § 71.4(e) (1979).
95 "Type A" and "Type B" quantities of materials are classified in the DOT regu-
lations according to aggregate radioactivity, in connection with the "transport group"
into which they fall. Transport groups are classified according to a material's "radi-
otoxicity and potential hazard in transportation." 49 C.F.R. § 173.389 (h) (1979).
Type B quantities are generally higher in curie activity than Type A. See 49 C.F.R. §
173.389(l) (1979).
" MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 79, at I.B.
- Id. I.A.
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its statutory authority to enter the field if the situation should
so dicate, and recently has asserted some authority. Specifi-
cally, two actions evidence that the NRC retains an interest in
the transport of radioactive materials. First, the Memorandum
of Understanding pledges that each agency shall "advise and
consult with the other" prior to issuance of any regulations in
the area." In the "Working Arrangements" section of the
Memorandum, the agencies agree each "will designate appro-
priate staff representatives and will establish joint working ar-
rangements from time to time for the purpose of administering
this memorandum of understanding." 9
The second and perhaps more salient indicium of in-
creased NRC interest is the NRC's recent regulatory action in
the area. First, there is a new NRC rule which requires per-
sons who possess or control formula quantities of strategic spe-
cial nuclear material in transit to meet general licensee re-
quirements."0 The general license to possess such special
nuclear material in transit requires carriers to ensure protec-
tion against theft and sabotage through an NRC-approved
transportation security plan.' The regulation also gives the
NRC a "legal basis for inspecting shipments in transit," 2 an
action that it previously undertook with the carriers on a vol-
untary basis." Secondly, the NRC recently adopted a regula-
tion which requires shippers and carriers currently licensed by
the NRC to implement a safeguards plan for spent fuel in
transit. 4 In conjunction with this rule, the NRC will impose
routing and other transport guidelines and require advance
notification for shipments of spent fuel."
- Id. VII.
"9 Id. VIII.
,0 44 Fed. Reg. 26,850-51 (1979) (to be codified in 10 C.F.R. § 70.20(a), effective
June 7, 1979).
gl Id.
92 43 Fed. Reg. 22,215 (1978).
93 Id.
" 44 Fed. Reg. 34,466 (1979)(to be codified in 10 C.F.R. § 73.37, effective July 16,
1979).
,1 Id. Pursuant to § 73.37, any licensee that transports or delivers to a carrier for
transport irradiated reactor fuel must notify the NRC in advance that a shipment is
to be made and must receive advance approval from the NRC of the specific route to
be utilized. The route should be "planned to avoid, where practicable, heavily popu-
lated areas." 44 Fed. Reg. 34,466 at 34,467 (1979) (to be codified in 10 C.F.R. §
1979-80]
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C. The Interstate Commerce Commission
Pursuant to section 10921 of the Interstate Commerce
Act,"8 all common and contract motor carriers are required to
obtain from the ICC a certificate or permit to transport mater-
ials. The authority previously held by the ICC under section
832 of the TEA to "prescribe the route or routes over which
such explosives [and] radioactive materials shall be trans-
ported"97 was transferred to the DOT in 1976.98
Although substantive control over transportation of haz-
ardous materials now resides in the DOT, the ICC retains ju-
risdiction to grant new transport authorizations and to subject
authorized motor carriers to "conditions the Commission finds
are required by public convenience and necessity." 9 This cer-
tification must be performed consistently with the national
transportation policy to "promote safe, adequate, economical,
and efficient transportation . . ... Notwithstanding that
safety is one of the designated goals of this policy, the ICC's
own interpretation of its residual safety jurisdiction over
radioactive materials is that it is limited to determining that
the safety regulations of the DOT and the NRC are met.10'
73.37(a)(3), effective July 16, 1979). The licensee must also ensure that other steps are
taken, including the provision of escorts, the use of specialized communications
equipment and provisions for local emergency response alerts. Id. The new NRC regu-
lations were examined by Judge John Garrett Penn of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia in Virginia Sunshine Alliance v. Hendrie, No. 79-
1989 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 1979)(order denying preliminary injunction), appeal docketed,
No. 79-2060 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 7, 1979). The court in Virginia Sunshine Alliance re-
viewed the process by which the NRC arrived at the new regulations and decided that
the NRC had given careful attention to the possible hazards and had developed safe-
guards accordingly. The court, without discussing preemption, held that the factor of
irreparable injury was not present, given the NRC safeguards, and thus refused to
grant a preliminary injunction against the transport of spent nuclear reactor fuel
through Portsmouth, Virginia.
, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10921 (Supp. 1979).
" 18 U.S.C. § 832 (1976).
" 49 U.S.C. § 1655(e)(4) (1976).
49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(e)(1) (Supp. 1979).
'® 49 U.S.C.A. § 10101(a)(2) (Supp. 1979).
,"I Decision of the Entire Interstate Commerce Commission in Dkt. Nos. 36-312,
et al., (November 22, 1978), afl'd, Akron, Canton & Youngstown RR v. I.C.C., 611
F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1979). However, the Sixth Circuit in its decision suggested that
the ICC's view of its safety jurisdiction may have been too narrow.
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Further interface between the ICC and the DOT in this
area is specifically provided for in the HMTA, which requires
the Secretary of Transportation to consult with the ICC in
promulgating substantive regulations."'2 The DOT is to "con-
sider any relevant suggestions made by [the ICC], before issu-
ing any regulation with respect to the routing of hazardous
materials."'' 3 In turn, the ICC must "to the extent of its law-
ful authority, take such action as is necessary or appropriate
to implement any such regulation." ' 4
Ill. STATE AND LOCAL REGULATORY SCHEMES
The nature of state and local regulation of hazardous
materials differs not only among jurisdictions but also among
modes of transportation. Historically, there has been a ten-
dency of the states and localities to assert greater regulatory
authority over highway transportation than over other modes.
Clearly, compliance with federal hazardous materials regula-
tions does not relieve a shipper or carrier of its obligation to
comply with certain types of state and local laws."0 5 For exam-
ple, states and localities have obvious responsibilities for
maintaining and protecting their highway systems, for traffic
control and for responding to emergency situations.
A particular state's or locality's requirements for trans-
porting hazardous materials may vest authority in a transpor-
tation, health, fire or police department. The extent to which
a coherent body of regulations exists will differ among juris-
dictions, but the result is often a balkanized set of restrictions
that is neither coherent as a whole nor easily accessible by car-
riers and shippers.
With respect to radioactive materials, a pattern of re-
quirements has emerged, generally falling into the following
categories:
(1) ordinances or regulations that operate to ban com-
pletely the transportation of radioactive materials through a
11 49 U.S.C. § 1804(b)(1976).
103 Id.
Id.
,o' See notes 4-14 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the nature and
sources of federal and state powers to regulate.
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given jurisdiction;' 6
(2) ordinances or regulations that impose significant reg-
ulation over such transport. Examples of these are speed lim-
its, requirements of escorts, permit requirements, time-of-day
transport restrictions, labelling requirements and limited rout-
ing rules;'"7
(3) ordinances or regulations that represent efforts on
behalf of a state or locality to monitor and receive information
concerning transportation of radioactive materials through its
jurisdiction;' 8 and
(4) ordinances or regulations that adopt partially or
completely the federal regulatory scheme. 0'
Some of these regulations apply to all radioactive materi-
als, while others cover specified categories. All usually include
"I Bans may be issued in the form of outright prohibitions, but often take the
form of transport permit requirements under which the criteria for obtaining such a
permit are, in all but the most unusual situations, unobtainable. A now famous exam-
ple of the latter is § 175.111 of the New York City Health Code, requiring any carrier
transporting specified radioactive materials through New York City limits to obtain a
"Certificate of Emergency Transport." Such certificate would be issued only "for the
most compelling reasons involving urgent public policy or national security interests
transcending public health and safety concerns. . . . [Elconomic considerations alone
will not be acceptable as justification" for issuance of a permit. (Limited exceptions
exist for federal government shipments for military or national security purposes re-
lated to national defense).
To conceptualize such a law as a mere permit requirement would, in elevating
form over substance, obscure its prohibitive effect. Because the criteria for obtaining a
permit are so stringent, no permit ever issues. Characterization of such laws as "rout-
ing requirements" is also a misnomer. As mentioned below, a routing rule would refer
to the paths a carrier could follow within a given jurisdiction. If the law prevents the
entity from entering the jurisdiction, the requirement does not route, but instead
bans.
"I E.g., Florida Control of Radiation Hazard Regulations, § 1OD-63.14 (1977)
(limited routing); Connecticut General Statutes 19-409d (1976)(permits); Maryland
Department of Transportation "Rules and Regulations Governing the Transportation
of Explosives and Other Danger Articles via Baltimore Harbor Tunnel" [and certain
bridges], § 11.9 (4) (1976)(distance between vehicles); Proposed New Jersey Dept. of
Env. Prot. Adm. Code, Title 7, ch. 28 (labelling, permits, routing, time-of-day,
escorts).
0I Florida Control of Radiation Hazard Regulations, § 1OD-63.14 (1977)(prior no-
tification); Maryland Department of Transportation "Rules and Regulations Gov-
erning the Transportation of Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles via Baltimore
Harbor Tunnel," § 11.9(1) (prior approval).
"I' Florida Control of Radiation Hazard Regulations, § 1OD- 63.12 (5) and (6)
(1977) (partial adoption); Minnesota State Board of Health Regulations "Ionizing Ra-
diation" Ch. 12, § 181(0 (total adoption).
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spent nuclear reactor fuel. Some of the regulations apply to a
particular mode of transport, and others appear to encompass
all modes of carriage. These regulations are distinguishable
from other exercises of state or local police power over the
highways by the fact that they select radioactive materials for
treatment separate and distinct from the jurisdiction's usual
traffic or transportation laws. Thus it is clear that the subject
of the regulation is radioactive substances specifically, in ad-
dition to transportation generally.
The remainder of this article will examine the validity of
these regulations under the applicable legal criteria. The
fourth category, because of its compatibility with most forms
of federal regulation, will be considered only in limited re-
spects. The first three groups will be addressed in detail where
appropriate.
IV. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND REGULATION OF RADIOACTIVE
MATERIALS TRANSPORT
Since Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v.
Ogden,"10 the struggle between deep-rooted principles of feder-
alism and the need for a uniform, systematic network of trans-
portation in the United States has confronted the courts.
From the scores of decisions grappling with this delicate bal-
ancing between federal and state decision-making, some en-
during guidelines have emerged. When a state's exercise of its
police powers is challenged under the supremacy clause,"'
there is a preliminary "assumption that the historic police
powers of the states were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress.""' In determining that this assumption has been over-
turned, thus precluding any state regulation of the subject in
question, courts have examined three principal factors: (1)
whether Congress has declared explicitly that the states are
"0 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
.' U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2. Preemption is based on the clause's mandate that
"Constitution and the Laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof... shall
be the supreme Law of the Land."
"I Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 239 (1947). Accord, Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
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prohibited from regulating the particular subject in ques-
tion;"13 (2) whether an encompassing array of federal legisla-
tion implicitly preempts state action;'" and (3) whether "the
Act of the Congress may touch a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be as-
sumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same sub-
ject.""' 5 Consideration of congressional intent is unnecessary
when state law is clearly preempted in that "compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibil-
ity. . "1i6 However, in situations in which Congress has not
preempted the entire field, the intent of Congress is relevant
and a state law will be preempted if it obstructs congressional
objectives."'
A. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
A recent application of the aforementioned guidelines was
presented in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO)," s which
examined a federal statute governing transportation in light of
a state's attempt to regulate the same field. Pursuant to the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA),119 the Secre-
tary of Transportation was authorized to regulate many as-
pects of design, construction certification and movement of
vessels in ports such as the Puget Sound. ARCO and Seatrains
Lines challenged a Washington state tanker law that similarly
regulated the design, structure, operation and size of oil tank-
ers in Puget Sound. The state law also required a tug escort
for vessels over a specified size.
In reviewing the Washington requirement that state-li-
censed pilots be placed on tankers in the Sound, the Court
examined statutory language and legislative history. The
Court concluded that the state requirements relating to cer-
tain types of shipping directly conflicted with the applicable
,,3 Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302 (1961).
"I Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
Its Id.
'0 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
" Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
435 U.S. 151 (1978).
"' Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, ch. 25, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (1976)
(amended 1978).
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federal statute and were preempted, 20 but that state laws per-
taining to other types were expressly permitted.1 21 Next con-
sidering the state's design and structure laws, the Court held
that Congress intended implementation, through the PWSA,
of "uniform national standards for design and construction of
tankers that would foreclose the imposition of different or
more stringent state requirements."'1 The Court noted that
both the state and federal requirements shared a common pur-
pose of vessel safety,12 but even if the state law had a different
purpose, the result apparently would have been the same.
Regarding the tug escort requirement for large vessels in
the port, the Court held that, since uniformity was not essen-
tial and the DOT had not yet promulgated any conflicting fed-
eral tug requirements, the state law was not preempted.12s
Thus the DOT's failure to mention tugs in the rules promul-
gated under the PWSA "to establish, operate, and maintain
vessel traffic services and systems for ports, harbors, and other
waters subject to congested vessel traffic,"1 2 was held to carry
no implication that there should be no tug requirements. Until
DOT promulgated regulations directly addressing the question
of tug escorts, "the State's requirement need not give way
under the Supremacy Clause."1
' 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978) (referring to 46 U.S.C. §§ 215,364 (1976)).
'2 Id. at 160 (referring to 33 U.S.C. § 1221(5) (Supp. V 1970)).
122 Id. at 163.
In Id. at 165.
121 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
[1It is suggested that the coexistence of federal and state regulatory legisla-
tion should depend upon whether the purposes of the two laws are parallel
or divergent. This Court has, on the one hand, sustained state statutes hav-
ing objectives virtually identical to those of federal regulations, California v.
Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730-31; cf. State of DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144,
156-57; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341; and has, on the other hand, struck
down state statutes where the respective purposes were quite dissimilar,
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S.
152. The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate or
the state regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be en-
forced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not
whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives.
Id. at 142.
"I Id. at 171-72.
12 33 U.S.C. § 1221(1) (1976) (renumbered and amended 1978).
I 435 U.S. at 172. In recent years, Supreme Court Justices have been more in-
1979-80]
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Finally, the Court struck down the state's tanker size lim-
itation. Declaring that the DOT had "addressed and acted
upon the question of size limitation,"' 28 the Court held the
state law was preempted by the DOT's judgment that vessels
regulated by and complying with the PWSA were safe to navi-
gate in the Puget Sound. 2 9
Delineation of the ARCO principles is instructive in ex-
amining the validity of state and local regulations governing
transportation of radioactive materials. The implications of
the discussion will be treated further in subsequent analysis.
B. The Supremacy Clause and the HMTA
There is to date no judicial ruling on the constitutionality
of state and local regulations governing highway transport of
radioactive material, but the area has not been unexplored. As
stated above, section 112 of the HMTA'30 initially invalidates
all state and local laws on the same subject inconsistent with
federal law, except when the DOT determines that preemp-
tion should not occur.
In September of 1976, the DOT issued regulations to im-
plement section 112.31 The regulations permit any person to
request the Office of Hazardous Materials Operations to rule
that a state or local law is inconsistent with federal law gov-
erning radioactive shipments. The rules require a two-pronged
inquiry: whether dual compliance with both state and federal
law is possible,'32 and whether the law obstructs the accom-
plishment and execution of the HMTA and regulations there-
under.' If a finding of inconsistency is made, the state or lo-
clined than earlier Justices to allow concurrent regulation by the states and the fed-
eral government in preemption cases. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine
and Shifting Perspectives of Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. Rav. 623
(1975).
121 435 U.S. at 174.
'2 Id.
130 49 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976). See notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text for
discussion of § 112 of the HMTA.
"1 49 C.F.R. §§ 107.1-.373 (1979).
132 Id. § 107.209(c)(1).
"I Id. § 107.209(c)(2). The DOT cited Florida Avocado Growers and Hines v. Da-
vidowitz as the sources of these tests. 41 Fed. Reg. 38,176 (1976).
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cality in question can seek a non-preemption ruling on the
basis that an equal or greater level of protection is offered by
the local law and that the law does not unreasonably burden
commerce. 1
34
1. Challenge to the New York City Health Code
The MTB issued the first decision on an application for a
ruling of inconsistency in April, 1978.35 The ruling resulted
from a challenge to the aforementioned New York City Health
Code ordinance, which prohibits transport of radioactive
materials within or through city borders without a "permit."' 3
At the time the ordinance was amended to prohibit shipments
without permits, Brookhaven National Laboratory, a govern-
ment-owned, contractor-operated facility under the supervi-
sion of Associated Universities, Inc. (AUI), had been shipping
nuclear materials through New York City.137 Because the per-
mit requirement obstructed such shipments, the United States
sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was uncon-
stitutional and requested preliminary and permanent injunc-
tive relief prohibiting enforcement of the law.
On January 30, 1976, in an unpublished order from the
bench, the court denied the motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion for failure to show immediate irreparable injury.'3 8 In ad-
dition, the court noted that the DOT had authority to issue a
federal preemption ruling and that the plaintiff must first seek
'u 49 C.F.R. § 107.215 (1979).
Associated Universities, Inc. Application for Inconsistency Ruling (DOT IR-1).
It should be mentioned, however, that the MTB had previously made at least one
informal inconsistency determination in a letter from MTB Acting Director Herbert
H. Kaiser to the Louisiana Office of Consumer Protection (Sept. 22, 1975), ruling that
a Louisiana law requiring prior notification to passengers boarding aircraft carrying
radioactive materials was inconsistent with the HMTA.
M~' New York City Health Code § 175.111 (1976). See note 106 supra for discus-
sion of the New York City ordinance as a total ban on transport of certain materials.
The materials that are effectively banned by the New York City ordinance include
spent reactor fuel and certain nuclear wastes.
I" Those materials included high enriched uranium fuel elements from the
Brookhaven National Laboratory shipped to a federal facility in South Carolina, and
materials shipped to and from John F. Kennedy Airport and the city's harbor facili-
ties for transport as part of the United States import-export program.
12 United States v. New York, No. 76-273 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1977).
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relief through that agency. '39 The court retained further juris-
diction over the case pending proceedings before the DOT.
After the injunction denial, AUI filed an application seek-
ing an inconsistency ruling from the MTB under section 112 of
the HMTA.'40 Public hearings on the matter were conducted
in New York City in November of 1977 and drew widespread
attention and participation.' Transporters and shippers of ra-
dioactive materials argued that the regulation posed an un-
lawful burden on interstate commerce and was preempted by
the HMTA and by the Atomic Energy Act. New York City
argued that state and local jurisdictions should have authority
to route the transportation of hazardous materials through
their borders, and that there were no outstanding federal regu-
lations or requirements that preempted such state and local
regulatory efforts."4
2. DOT's Ruling: No Preemptive Regulations Under
HMTA
On April 4, 1978, the DOT ruled that section 175.111 of
the New York City Health Code was not inconsistent with re-
quirements of the HMTA or issued regulations.' Although
the DOT acknowledged that the health ordinance had the
"practical effect of forbidding the transportation of most com-
mercial shipments of radioactive materials in or through the
'11 This apparent application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction has not been
the only example under the HMTA. See Kappelman v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 539 F.2d
165 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(passenger seeking requirement that all passengers on planes car-
rying radioactive materials must first seek relief in DOT rulemaking); and Consoli-
dated Rail Corp. v. City of Dover, 450 F. Supp. 966 (D. Del. 1978)(city seeking blan-
ket injunction against violation of HMTA must first seek relief in DOT rulemaking).
But see Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 453 F.
Supp. 920 (N.D. Ill. 1977)(holding state law preempted but noting the possibility of a
waiver from the DOT).
,4 42 Fed. Reg. 41,204 (1977).
43 Fed. Reg. 16,954 (1978).
141 Id. at 16,955-58.
143 Id. The ruling held that "inconsistency describes situations wherein it is not
possible to comply with both Federal and State requirements, and situations wherein
State requirements are an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the Fed-
eral law." Id. at 16,955. This test is mandated by 49 C.F.R. §§ 107.209 (c)(1), (2)
(1979).
[Vol. 68
TRANSPORTING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
city,""' it emphasized the longstanding recognition of state
and local interests in regulation of highway transportation.145
The DOT's holding was narrowly based on a strict inter-
pretation of the meaning of the phrase "any requirement
under this chapter or regulations issued under this chapter" as
stated in section 112.146 The DOT considered the New York
City ordinance to be, in terms of its purpose and effects,
analogous to a routing requirement14 and then scrutinized
whether a similar "routing regulation" existed under the
HMTA or regulations thereunder."' The DOT first concluded
that section 175.111 was not inconsistent with the general re-
quirements contained in the text of the" HMTA and stated
that without implementing regulations the HMTA does not
impose obligations on members of the public. Instead, the
only "requirements" contained in the Act other than the regu-
lations thereunder are those imposed upon the Secretary."'
"As a result, it is in regulations issued under the HMTA that
requirements must be found upon which this proceeding's in-
terpretation can be based."'' 0
The DOT found no specific highway routing requirement
contained in any regulations promulgated under the HMTA to
be applicable to transport of radioactive materials. Although
the DOT had issued a regulation pertaining to shipment
routes of all hazardous materials,' it had not issued any
m 43 Fed. Reg. 16,956 (1978).
" Id. at 16,955.
" "Preemption cannot occur without the existence of a federal requirement
under the HMTA, which we construe to mean an obligation to act or refrain from
action." Id.
" Id. at 16,957.
" Id. at 16,956.
"4 Id.
'~' Id.
49 C.F.R. § 397.9 (1978) requires certain carriers of radioactive materials by
truck to avoid particular routes, where practicable:
(a) Unless there is no practicable alternative, a motor vehicle which
contains hazardous materials must be operated over routes which do not go
through or near heavily populated areas, places where crowds are assem-
bled, tunnels, narrow streets, or alleys. Operating convenience is not a basis
for determining whether it is practicable to operate a motor vehicle in ac-
cordance with this paragraph.
This regulation is similar to the NRC routing guideline in 44 Fed. Reg. 26,850-51
(1979) (to be codified in 10 C.F.R. § 73.37, effective July 16, 1979).
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under the HMTA.5 2 "Consequently, any preemptive effects
that 49 C.F.R. § 397.9 may have do not arise under the
HMTA."'53 Since the DOT found no applicable requirements
with which the New York City ordinance could be ruled incon-
sistent, it allowed the ordinance to stand. '54.
In its ruling the DOT also cautioned:
The legal validity of § 175.111 is still subject to serious
doubt. This opinion dealt only with highway carriage, as
raised by AUI. Air, rail and water carriage are more thor-
oughly imbued with a Federal interest and this opinion does
not apply to transportation by those modes .... § 175.111
may be preempted by the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution, or by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
and regulations issued thereunder .... Finally, whatever
the ultimate legal effect of § 175.111, such provisions may
face a necessary future harmonization with rulemaking that
results from the inquiry MTB intends to undertake. '
In light of its holding, the DOT accompanied its ruling
with an announcement of an intent to commence a rulemak-
ing process to consider the need for routing requirements
under the HMTA for highway carriage of radioactive materi-
als. ' The proposed rules and announcement of rulemaking
were published on January 31, 1980.15' As proposed, the rules
would amend HMTA regulations to impose general routing
guidelines for all placarded radioactive materials. For "large
quantities" of radioactive materials, including spent fuel, the
rules require routing on "preferred highways", i.e., interstates
or alternative routes designated by the states under certain
152 43 Fed. Reg. 16,954 at 16,957 (1978).
' Id.
"I' Had § 397.9 been applicable the DOT hinted that it probably would have pre-
empted the New York City ban. Because the ban provides no practicable alternative
for routing around New York City by truck, Brookhaven National Laboratories has
been forced to ship the spent fuel by ferry. The DOT declared in its ruling that "prac-
ticable alternative" as contained in § 397.9 does not include alternatives using other
modes. Hence any local "routing" law forcing such transhipment would be inconsis-
tent with federal law. Id.
" 43 Fed. Reg. 16,954 at 16,958 (1978).
"' Id. This rulemaking was publicly noticed on August 17, 1978. 43 Fed. Reg.
36,472 (1978).
"1 45 Fed. Reg. 7140 (1980).
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criteria. The rule also requires development of a security plan
for shipment and reporting to the DOT (although not neces-
sarily reported in advance) of routes used. Driver training is
required for large quantity shipments. When NRC route
requirements or security plans for spent fuel apply, the DOT
references and defers of the NRC-approved route and plan.
The rule contains express preemption sections.' These
rules, if they become final, would clarify substantially what
state and local laws would be preempted under the HMTA.
Certain items, such as permit fees or speed limits, do not ap-
pear to be resolved.
3. Criticism of the DOT Ruling
Although technically the DOT may be correct in noting
that there currently is no highway routing requirement issued
under the HMTA, the ruling overlooks two important points.
First, a jurisdiction's ban of all transportation through its bor-
ders is not merely a routing restriction, but is a ban, a type of
restriction that is qualitatively distinct. A routing restriction,
if imposed by New York City, might have been a restriction
that barred access to certain routes through New York City
and allowed others; but when no routes through New York
City are allowed, such a complete ban may not reasonably be
labelled a routing restriction. Hence the DOT's mischaracter-
ization led to an inapposite mode of analysis. Second, it is
hypertechnical and frustrative of congressional purpose con-
' The proposed section reads:
Except as otherwise permitted under paragraph (b)(4) of this section,
State and local requirements which apply to any person because that person
transports radioactive materials are inconsistent with this subchapter if
they have any of the following effects.
(1) Completely prohibiting travel between any two points serviced by
highway;
(2) Prohibiting the use of an Interstate highway, including prohibition
of travel based on time of day, without designation of an equivalent pre-
ferred highway as a substitute in accordance with the provisions of this
section;
(3) Requiring use of a preferred highway except in accordance with
the provisions of this section;
(4) Requiring prenotification or escort requirements, except as estab-
lished under paragraph (b)(4) of this section; or
(5) Requiring special personnel or equipment.
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tained in section 112 to require specific promulgated regula-
tions to be the only "requirement" considered as a basis for
inconsistency. The general requirements for safe, uniform and
efficient transportation embodied in the HMTA itself should
have been considered.5 9
The DOT did not cite the tug requirement portion of the
ARCO decision, decided a month before, for support of its rul-
ing. ' Although the tug holding may at first glance appear to
provide a rule of decision, in fact the issues involved are not
the same. In ARCO, imposition of a tug requirement was not
so burdensome as. to be in fact prohibitive of any transporta-
tion through the port. The Court noted that the DOT had is-
"' On December 20, 1979, the DOT published its second inconsistency ruling (IR-
2). 44 Fed. Reg. 75,566 (1979). That ruling addressed Rhode Island Regulations gov-
erning transportation of liquified natural gas and liquified petroleum gas. The ruling
held that certain of the requirements were inconsistent with HTMA regulation: equip-
ment requirements; receipt of a permit prior to transport; time-of-day restrictions;
and the requirement for written accident reports to the Rhode Island Department of
Transportation. Four others were allowed to stand: operation with headlights at all
times; vehicle inspection at loading and unloading points; immediate accident notifi-
cation to State Police; and two-way radio communicators. This ruling is helpful in
three respects. It provided guidance for HMTA preemption of many regulations such
as permit requirements and time-of-day restrictions (though not conclusive in the for-
mer case). It also gave recognition to the underlying purpose of the HMTA and Haz-
ardous Materials Regulations: "The manifest purpose . . .is safety in the transporta-
tion of hazardous materials. Delay in such transportation is incongruous with safe
transportation." 44 Fed. Reg. at 75,571. The DOT also cited to 49 C.F.R. § 177.853,
which proscribes "unnecessary delay" in movement of hazardous materials. Id. Fi-
nally, IR-2 recognized
certain areas where the need for national uniformity is so crucial and the
scope of Federal regulation is so pervasive that it is difficult to envision any
situation where State or local regulation would not prevent an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the HMTA and the Hazardous Mater-
ials Regulations.
44 Fed. Reg. 75,588. Cargo containment and warning systems are examples. Id.. These
principles presumably apply with equal or greater force to the New York City ban
than to, e.g., time-of-day restrictions. The DOT attempted to distinguish the Associ-
ated Universities, Inc. ruling as involving a "unique local safety problem," maintain-
ing that "there was no requirement under the HMTA at the time that adequately
dealt with the peculiar problems of the New York City." 44 Fed. Reg. at 75,569.
Whether this is in fact accurate (see discussion of 49 C.F.R. § 397.9, supra), it also
contradicts the DOT's recognition in IR-2 of the need for uniformity in certain areas
and the need to avoid transport delays. The New York City ban, and others like it,
contravenes both of these policies.
,S See text accompanying notes 125-29 supra for discussion of the tug escort re-
quirement in ARCO.
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sued an Advance Notice of Public Rulemaking on tug escorts,
and that, when issued, the requirements would be intended to
provide uniform guidance for the maritime industry."' If the
New York City law had in fact been a routing rule, a search to
determine the existence of an applicable parallel federal rule
might have been more appropriate. Parallelism was com-
pletely lacking, however, between the requirement the DOT
was searching for under the HMTA and its regulations and
the requirement that New York City had in fact imposed,
largely because the ban had been characterized as a routing
requirement.
4. Suggested Analysis of State and Local Regulations
If one undertook inquiry of the New York City ordinance
realizing that it was in fact a ban, and then applied the analy-
sis performed by the Court in ARCO, an analogy seems appo-
site. As with the size limitations in ARCO, it can be argued
that the Secretary had examined and considered the appropri-
ateness of transport of radioactive materials and had deter-
mined that no bans should be imposed on such transport.1 2 In
addition, one could contend that the congressional declaration
that transport should occur in accordance with the HMTA
also is an affirmative "requirement" of the Act itself.
Analytically, the New York City ordinance aligns more
appropriately with the size limitation set of regulations struck
down by the Court in the ARCO case, since the law represents
a second guess by the city as to the safety of transport of radi-
oactive materials.' Since the agency limited its inquiry to
18 435 U.S. at 172.
112 See 49 C.F.R. § 107.209(c)(1), (2) (1978).
"I Hence the Court in ARCO held that a maximum vessel size restriction could
not be established by the state, even where no such restriction had been established
under federal law.
The Court has previously recognized that "where failure of. . . federal offi-
cials affirmatively to exercise their full authority takes on the character of a
ruling no such regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy
of the statute." States are not permitted to use their police power to enact
such a regulation. [Citations omitted] We think that in this case the Secre-
tary's failure to promulgate a ban on the operations of oil tankers in excess
of 125,000 DWT in Puget Sound takes on such a character.
435 U.S. at 178.
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whether a specific federal requirement in conflict with the
New York ordinance existed, this point was never reached.
Neither the full purpose and intent of the HMTA, nor the fact
that transport is presupposed under that Act, was compared
against the transport ban.
Absent a federal requirement under the "HMTA specifi-
cally permitting transport in a given state or locality, the dual
compliance test '64 of inconsistency is inadequate. However, in
all but the rarest circumstances, a ban on an activity affirma-
tively regulated by federal law would appear to pose an obsta-
cle to fulfillment of the purpose of the law. 65 If a ban were
deemed appropriate by Congress, it would impose it, and to
the extent an authorized agency issues regulations that as-
sume no ban exists, states and localities should be deemed to
be foreclosed from imposing such a ban. This implied restraint
on state bans would meet the test of inconsistency without the
necessity of pinpointing contrary regulations.
A second consideration that is also overlooked is that a
ban destroys the subject of federal regulation within that ju-
risdiction, thus having the practical effect of divesting the
Secretary of Transportation of his authority to regulate trans-
port of the materials in question. 6 This result directly con-
flicts with the HMTA's purpose of improving the regulatory
and enforcement authority of the Secretary of Transportation
over hazardous materials. '67
Substantive requirements short of a ban, such as time-of-
day restrictions, permit fees, limited routing rules, escort re-
quirements and speed limits, to the extent they do not effec-
tively constitute bans, are more likely to be the types of re-
strictions which could trigger a search for existence of a
164 49 C.F.R. § 107.209(c) (1978). As noted, this approach is to be used by the
DOT to determine whether state and federal requirements are inconsistent with each
other. Id.
,65 See text accompanying notes 116-17 supra for delineation of the impact of con-
gressional intent.
"I Cf. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942), holding that the
State of Alabama could not confiscate butter under authority of its ovn statute, since
this action had the practical effect of divesting the federal government of its sole au-
thority over the manufacturer of renovated butter.
,67 49 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (1976).
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similar "requirement" under the HMTA. 65 For example, the
Court in ARCO held that, until the Secretary had considered
and acted upon the need for tug escorts, state regulations
could impose such a "requirement." Possibly, the failure to
find an applicable "requirement" under the Act indicates that
the DOT has not yet ruled out state regulation in that area
and does not consider such rules necessary to the execution of
the Act. This mode of analysis again overly constricts the in-
quiry and prematurely forecloses any analysis of dual compli-
ance or, more importantly, frustration of the goals of the
HMTA. ,69
Assuming that an inconsistency had been found under
section 112(a) in Associated Universities, Inc., the second
phase of inquiry, 70 which would proceed under section 112(b),
would be whether a ban affords the same or greater level of
protection to the public. This inquiry, however, is problemati-
cal. It is possible that a ban would afford greater protection to
the public in view of the need for unimpeded transport of nu-
clear materials (particularly waste) and the potential lack of
alternate routes, or the existence only of routes that require
longer transport over less adequate facilities. In any event, as
analyzed below, it is likely that the bans could be shown to
unduly burden commerce as that concept is employed in sec-
tion 112(b).
5. The Supreme Court's Balancing Approach to the
"Burden on Commerce"
The Supreme Court's current approach to the "burden on
commerce"' 7' question is a factually-based, case-by-case ap-
"' See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). See also Braniff Air-
ways, Inc. v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Met. Airport Comm'n, 377 F. Supp. 1190 (D.
Minn. 1974)(dismissing airline request for a preliminary injunction against airport
commission's ordinance which provided for monitoring of radioactive shipments to
ensure federal rules governing packaging, marking and transportation were being fol-
lowed.) The court allowed this state program to stand in the absence of a federal
monitoring system. See also IR-2, discussed in note 159 supra.
Il See note 159 supra, which indicates that the DOT has relaxed this restrictive
view somewhat in IR-2.
"I See note 130 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the inquiry as to
state law as an obstruction to execution of the HMTA.
17 The Commerce Clause proscribes state or local regulations that represent an
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proach that balances the need for a uniform and unimpeded
flow of commerce against the legitimate need of states and lo-
calities to supervise local safety concerns.1 72 If the state or lo-
cal ordinance does not discriminate against interstate com-
merce per se and purports to further a local health or safety
concern, it may nevertheless be voided if the regulation is
"clearly excessive in relation to putative local benefits."'13
The Court effects this balancing approach by examining
(1) whether and to what extent the regulations contribute to
purported safety goals,"' and (2) whether the regulations con-
comitantly "impose a substantial burden on the interstate
movement of goods."'' 5 Both showings are amenable to factual
evidence, as well as logical persuasion, and litigants in a case
challenging a ban in the face of the balancing approach used
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,'75 would be well advised to pro-
duce as much evidence as possible on the safety, economic
and technological implications of such a ban.'77 For example,
in Raymond Motor Transportation Co., Inc. v. Rice,"" the
Court emphasized the state's failure to support the safety ben-
efits derived from its local law. The carrier, on the other hand,
produced detailed information on the lack of such safety bene-
fits as well as the substantial burdens emanating from that
impermissible burden on interstate commerce, but the Court has grappled often with
the conflict between this principle and the "police power" of the states. See The Min-
nesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 262
(1827); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
'72 See Raymond Motor Transportation Co. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441-43 (1978).
See also Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1976);
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794, 804 (1970).
" Raymond Motor Transportation Co. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441-42 (1978).
,' Id. at 443-45.
' Id. at 445-46. In the lower court decision, the judge had not considered this
latter factor pertinent. The Supreme Court clearly disagreed and emphasized evi-
dence on cost increases, carriage slowdowns, the necessity of double hauls and inter-
ference with acceptance by the carrier of some shipments from certain other carriers.
178 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
In See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. Ray. 1, 27-28
(1940). The author observed that the outcome of commerce clause litigation turns
heavily "upon the thoroughness with which the lawyers perform their task in the con-
duct of constitutional litigation. Here, as in many other fields, constitutionality is
conditioned upon the facts ..
17 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
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particular restriction on truck size.
It is not difficult to appreciate that total bans facially
pose the greatest threat to interstate commerce. A challenger
could undoubtedly amass a large arsenal of facts demonstrat-
ing the additional costs, routing problems and frustration of
delivery resulting from an inability to pass into or through an
entire state or locality, particularly if a destination facility or
an important segment of interstate highway were located in
that state or locality. In addition, facilities needing to trans-
port materials out of the state might be able to demonstrate
increased difficulties resulting from having to retain radioac-
tive materials in increasing quantities.
Since the "burden on commerce showing" could be made
quite soundly, the focus of such litigation would likely fall on
the safety showing required by the Pike and Raymond Motors
decisions. It may seem intuitive that transport of radioactive
materials poses per se safety problems and that a state or lo-
cality might need only advert to the word "radioactive" and
rest its case. The safety issue, however, is not so simple. In
fact, the history of radioactive materials transport is exem-
plary in terms of safety.' Thus, a state or locality would find
it extremely difficult to prove that a ban on transport provides
any significant increment of safety. ' In short, the bans could
'"' A recent NRC Staff study, "Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air
and Other Modes", NUREG-0170 at viii (Dec. 1977) concluded: "[Tihe NRC staff has
determined that the environmental impacts of normal transportation of radioactive
material and the risks attendant to accidents involving radioactive material ship-
ments are sufficiently small to allow continued shipments by all modes ....
[TIransportation conducted under present regulations provides adequate safety to the
public. . . ." Subsequently, Sandia Laboratories issued its working draft assessment
of Transportation of Radionuclides in Urban Environs, and found the occurrence of
an accident causing serious impacts unlikely, and that radiological impacts from nor-
mal transport are small. SAND 77-1927 at 31, 41 (May, 1979). Similarly, the DOT
declared in its Associated Universities, Inc., ruling that:
Radioactive materials . . . can without question be shipped safely in the
normal course of transportation. It would be extremely hard to support the
assertion that radioactive materials, even materials with very high radiation
levels, cannot be moved safely under any circumstances, given the excellent
twenty-five year record of their commercial transportation.
43 Fed. Reg. 16,957 (1978).
"I See So. Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781-82 (1945). In fact, in its Envi-
ronmental Assessment accompanying its proposed rule for highway routing of radioac-
tive materials, the DOT noted this fact.
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be shown to represent laws that are "clearly excessive in rela-
tion to putative local benefits."''
States and localities have imposed other substantive re-
strictions short of total bans on passage of radioactive materi-
als through their borders. Some examples are time-of-day or-
week restrictions, speed limits, escort requirements, routing
designations within the jurisdiction and "permit" require-
ments fees. These restrictions might be supported by an al-
leged safety goal,'82 but when states or localities impose such
requirements only on radioactive materials the laws should be-
come suspect. Examination of such laws presents primarily a
fact-specific problem for a case-by-case determination. It is
suggested, however, that use of a "balancing approach" that
focuses only on the particular law in question may be overly
narrow.
Many of these substantive laws, while not overly burden-
some when viewed in isolation, have potential cumulative im-
pacts which could bring transport to a standstill, particularly
when such regulations are enacted at local, as well as state,
levels. For example, if twenty counties or municipalities in one
state each imposed a transport fee of $100.00 the total addi-
tional cost added to transport in that state alone would be
$2000.00. Similarly, if contiguous counties permitted transport
only between specified hours it could cause considerable delay
in the transport of nuclear materials. While most commerce
clause cases have not expressly examined this potential for cu-
mulative in, pact, it has been noted in preemption discussions
in which the need for uniform nationwide regulation was at
issue.' 3 Cumulative impacts should be considered in com-
merce clause analysis particularly in the context of the present
discussion where the analysis is tied to the preemption aspects
,8 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
,82 See Erb v. Morasch, 177 U.S. 584 (1900)(upholding general state speed limit
on trains).
"I Thus in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639
(1973) the Supreme Court, in holding a local time of day for jet takeoff restriction
invalid under the Supremacy Clause, noted that "[i]f we were to uphold the Burbank
ordinance and a significant number of municipalities followed suit, it is obvious that
fractionalized control of the timing of takeoffs and landings would severely limit the
flexibility of FAA controlling air traffic flow."
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of the HMTA.14 It is conceivable that a showing similar to
that in Raymond Motors could be made to establish that fees,
time-of-day or-week restrictions, escort requirements and the
like, while purportedly serving some legitimate local safety
concern, do not sufficiently advance safety to justify the ex-
treme burden such requirements may impose on commerce.
C. The Supremacy Clause and the TEA
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR)
constitute rules directly affecting the shipment of hazardous
materials and were recently reissued under the HMTA.55
However, sections 397.3 and 397.9 of the FMCSR were not
repromulgated under the HMTA and are still enforced under
the TEA. '86 Because of this failure to repromulgate, the provi-
sions were not considered in the DOT inconsistency ruling. As
previously discussed, these regulations concern the highway
carriage of hazardous materials and would have been perti-
nent under the DOT's characterization of the ban.
Section 397.3 states that "[e]very motor vehicle contain-
ing hazardous materials must be driven and parked" in com-
pliance with state and local laws, "unless they are at variance
with specific regulations" of the DOT which "impose a more
stringent obligation or restraint." ' Section 397.3 thus gives
the states and municipalities free reign to impose more strin-
gent safety regulations over the driving and handling of motor
vehicles. The preemptive effect of section 397.3 is limited to
occasions when a stronger DOT requirement varies from less
stringent state or local regulation. No case law yet determines
whether the preemptive conditions of section 397.3 encom-
pass routing regulations that vary from federal policy. Con-
sidering the Court's permissive attitude toward concurrent
" See notes 131-33 supra and accompanying text for discussion of preemption
under the HMTA. The safety purposes furthered by cumulative local regulations
may be more apparent than real. Raymond Motor Transp. Co. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429
(1978).
" 49 C.F.R. §§ 390.1-397.21 (1979).
,s' 49 C.F.R. §§ 397.3 and 397.9 (1979). See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying
text for a discussion of the TEA.
1- 49 C.F.R. § 397.3 (1979).
1979-801
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
regulation,' state routing requirements that define the practi-
cal highway alternatives available to shippers are likely to be
upheld. Similarly, state requirements that vary from the TEA
in enforcement procedures and sanctions are probably valid.
On the other hand, section 397.9 is a restrictive federal high-
way routing requirement. The language of section 397.9(a)
limits the carrier to choosing alternate routes, rather than al-
ternate modes, of carriage. '89 The TEA does not speak directly
to preemption, and hence section 397.9(a) policy does not have
the preemptive effect that has been conferred on regulations
under the HMTA; rather, its preemptive effect is unclear.
However, state laws that foreclose all practicable alternatives
by banning all highway transportation of hazardous materials
would run counter to the DOT's interpretation of section
397.9.11 Hence, the scope of state or local legislation that the
TEA and section 397.9 appear to preempt would be only ac-
tual routing bans, a result reached under general preemption
analysis or under section 112 of the HMTA.
D. The Supremacy Clause and the Atomic Energy Act
There is a considerable amount of judicial enunciation re-
garding the extent to which NRC regulation of radioactive
materials preempts concurrent state and local efforts. The
Atomic Energy Act, particularly section 274 of that Act and
the regulations implementing it, help resolve and clarify a
number of questions regarding the respective jurisdiction of
the federal government and the states to regulate health,
safety, common defense and security hazards relating to
source, by-product and special nuclear materials and produc-
tion and utilization facilities.'91 Section 274 evinces congres-
I" Cf. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1962), in which a
regulation of the ICC prohibited carriers of explosives from traveling through or into
congested thoroughfares, tunnels, viaducts, dangerous crossings and places where
crowds assemble. See also DOT Associated Universities, Inc. ruling, 43 Fed. Reg.
16,958 (1978); and "Opinion of Department of Transportation General Counsel," dis-
cussed therein.
,", See note 127 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the present judi-
cial attitude toward concurrent regulation.
"' See note 151 supra for discussion of no "practicable alternative" under § 397.9.
"' See notes 17-56 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the regulation
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sional recognition of the NRC's sole authority to regulate radi-
ation hazards associated with the uses of source, by-product
and special nuclear material and production and utilization
facilities.'92 While regulatory authority over the packaging,
shipment and carriage of those materials in interstate com-
merce is shared with other federal agencies, 93 Congress in-
tended that no state could regulate radiological hazards asso-
ciated with the packaging, shipment and carriage of source,
by-product and special nuclear materials except pursuant to a
section 274 agreement.'94
The states also are foreclosed from assuming regulatory
authority with respect to: (1) the waste separated from irradi-
ated fuel at a reprocessing facility; (2) irradiated fuel being
transported from a nuclear reactor to a storage or reprocessing
facility; and (3) unirradiated fuel being transported to a cus-
tomer. 15 Finally, state regulations governing aspects of the
transportation of nuclear materials which those states are au-
thorized to regulate must be "compatible" with the applicable
federal regulations.'
The landmark decision analyzing preemption under the
Atomic Energy Act is Northern States Power Co. v. Minne-
sota. '9 Minnesota enacted a law attempting to regulate,
through the use of a permit mechanism, the release of radioac-
tive liquid and gaseous discharges from nuclear power facili-
of radioactive materals under the Atomic Energy Act. See generally Federal Preemp-
tion of State Laws Controlling Nuclear Power, 64 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1323 (1976); Mur-
phy & La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and the Supremacy
Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 CoLuM. L. Rv. 392 (1976); Cavers, State
Responsibility in the Regulation of Atomic Reactors, 50 Ky. L.J. 29 (1961); Neel, Fed-
eral or State Jurisdiction over Atomic Products and Waste-A Dilemma, 50 Ky. L.J.
52 (1961).
92 See notes 28-56 supra for delineation of the authority conferred under § 274 of
the Atomic Energy Act. See also Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d
1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
"I The Commission has never objected to this concurrent jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. No. 1975, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3351.
'9' See notes 28-56 supra and accompanying text for discussion of § 274.
1 See notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of forbidden
state regulation.
"I' See notes 47-55 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the compati-
bility requirement.
197 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
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ties. After a thorough discussion of the Atomic Energy Acts of
1946 and 1954, as well as section 274, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that the state law was preempted. The court
noted that the law covered an area over which the AEC could
not, under section 274, relinquish authority to the states, '
i.e., effluents pertaining to a production or utilization facility.
In addition, the court found that section 274 exhibited con-
gressional intent that the only regulation of radiation hazards
which states could undertake would be those allowed to it
under a section 274 agreement. All other regulation would be
barred.9 '
The theme of preemption in this area was examined and
reaffirmed in two recent federal district court decisions,
United States v. New York "' and Pacific Legal Foundation v.
California State Energy Resources Conservation & Develop-
ment Commission (CERCDC).211 In New York, the City of
New York through its Health Code ordinance12 required a per-
mit for the operation of a "nuclear reactor or critical fission-
, ' Id. at 1146.
The court stated:
Thus, through direction of the licensing scheme for nuclear reactors, Con-
gress vested the AEC with the authority to resolve the proper balance be-
tween desired industrial progress and adequate health and safety standards.
Only through the application and enforcement of uniform standards
promulgated by a national agency will these dual objectives be assured.
Were the states allowed to impose stricter standards on the level of radioac-
tive waste releases discharged from nuclear power plants, they might con-
ceivably be so overprotective in the area of health and safety as to unneces-
sarily stultify the industrial development and use of atomic energy for the
production of electronic power.
Id. at 1153-54. But see Goldberg v. Hendrick, 254 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Pa. 1966)(up-
holding conviction under Pennsylvania law of a trespasser onto construction site of a
nuclear facility even though the AEC had promulgated a trespass regulation pursuant
to § 2278(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Rather than finding that the Act pre-
empted concurrent law, the court's decision was based on conflict analysis, and the
court found no conflict to exist); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metro-
politan Airport Comm'n, 377 F. Supp. 1190, 1192 (D. Minn. 1974)(denying prelimi-
nary injunction against local monitoring requirement for handling of radioactive
materials at airport in light of a preemption challenge under the Atomic Energy Act.
The ruling was based largely on a lack of irreparable injury, however, and the judge
acknowledged the plaintiffs appeared "to have substantial precedential support for
their view of the preemption issue." Id.)
463 F. Supp. 604 (1978).
' 472 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
2 New York City Health Code § 175.107(c).
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able assembly" within the City. Although Columbia Univer-
sity received full authorization from the NRC to construct and
operate its Triga Mark II research reactor, the City denied Co-
lumbia's request for a permit. After a painstaking analysis of
section 274 and reference to Northern States Power,13 the
court said:
[Tihe federal government has exclusive authority under the
doctrine of preemption to regulate the construction and op-
eration of nuclear reactors, which necessarily includes licens-
ing for radiological health and safety. Section 175.107(c) of
the New York City Health Code establishing a dual system
of licensing and regulation with control exerted by both the
City and the federal government is, therefore, void."'
Challenged in Pacific Legal Foundation was a state law
requiring certification by the California Energy Resource Con-
servation and Development Commission (CERCDC) of all nu-
clear facilities constructed in the state. Section 25524.2 of the
California Public Resources Code1 5 required a finding by the
CERCDC that a high-level nuclear waste disposal technology
existed and had been approved prior to certifying any individ-
ual reactor. Because the CERCDC determined that no such
approved technology existed, section 25524.2 operated as a
state bar to nuclear plant construction. Faced with this issue,
District Judge William B. Enright declared the statute invalid
on two grounds: 1) the statute was directly preempted under
section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act; and 2) the statute con-
flicted with federal law because it stood as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the goals of the Atomic Energy Act to en-
courage the development and utilization of nuclear energy.
To support his finding of preemption, Judge Enright cited
Northern States Power and United States v. New York for the
proposition that section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act barred
state regulation of radiation hazards from construction or op-
eration of a nuclear utilization facility.
20 6
Judge Enright declared that even if section 274 did not
" Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
211 463 F. Supp. at 614.
2U CAL. PUBLIC RESOURCES CODE § 25524.2.
"1 472 F. Supp. at 197-98.
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preclude enactment of section 25524.2, that law would be void
under Hines v. Davidowitz"' which requires state regulations
to bow to federal regulation concerning the same subject.
Judge Enright noted:
There seems little point in enacting an Atomic Energy Act
and establishing a federal agency to promulgate extensive
and pervasive regulations on the subject of construction and
operation of nuclear reactors and the disposal of nuclear
waste if it is within the perogative of the states to interdict
the use of atomic energy within their borders."'
The NRC has emphatically explained that any attempts
by states or localities to regulate radiation-related issues can
be undertaken pursuant only to a section 274 agreement. Fur-
ther, all state regulation pertaining to production and utiliza-
tion facilities, or materials in quantities sufficient to form a
critical mass, is barred absolutely."' Such administrative in-
terpretations are accorded significant weight in judicial exami-
nation of statutory preemption. 210
In light of this detailed and emphatic precedent, the state
and local laws regulating transportation of radioactive materi-
als can be examined. The most crucial fact to consider is that
almost all such laws, like the New York ban, are directed spe-
cifically and exclusively at radioactive materials. Hence,
rather than representing general transportation laws more
likely to be within the state's substantial police powers, they
signify by structure attempts to regulate the problems specific
to radioactive materials. Thus general speed limits that apply
to all transport or general routing rules that might reroute all
large trucks around a particular bridge might not be deemed
to be directed at radiation hazards.2
-312 U.S. 52 (1941).
211 472 F. Supp. at 200.
"I See Interpretation by the General Counsel: AEC Jurisdiction over Nuclear Fa-
cilities and Materials Under the Atomic Energy Act, 10 C.F.R. § 8.4 (1979).
210 See Note, Federal Preemption of State Laws: The Effect of Regulatory Agency
Attitudes on Judicial Decision-Making, 50 IND. L.J. 48 (1975).
211 See, e.g., "Opinion of Evelle J. Younger," 50 Op. Calif. Att'y Gen. 77/50 (April
25, 1978)(holding California bill governing licensing production and utilization facili-
ties in California preempted).
In the DOT's Rhode Island IR-2 ruling, supra note 159, the agency allowed the
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Once it is determined that a particular law is aimed at
radiation hazards, a determination must follow as to which
laws are permissible or, more precisely, capable of being un-
dertaken pursuant to a section 274 agreement. State laws gov-
erning all radioactive materials would be invalid to the extent
that they encompass any materials in quantities sufficient to
form a critical mass 212 and any materials such as spent or fresh
fuel being transported to or from a nuclear power plant, or to
or from a fuel reprocessing plant .2 1 This preemptive effect oc-
curs because the NRC cannot, even under section 274, surren-
der regulatory authority over these subjects to the states.
Transportation of the remainder of radioactive materials,
such as research isotopes for medical use, may be regulated by
a state only to the extent that there exists a section 274 agree-
ment with the NRC and that the state law is compatible with
NRC regulations. In this framework, bans on transport of all
materials clearly would be preempted.
Bans generally would be assumed to be void under rea-
soning similar to that discussed in relation to the DOT rules.
Bans on the limited category of materials that the NRC allows
the state to regulate would probably be deemed incompatible
with NRC regulations, unless consistent with a specific NRC
rule paralleling such a ban. An additional consideration exists
for irradiated fuel. Even if the states could regulate the trans-
port of irradiated reactor fuel, it would be allowable only on a
basis compatible with standards implemented under the new
rule governing such transport.2 14
Imposition of other substantive requirements, such as
limited routing, prenotification rules or time-of-day restric-
tions on other materials, would likewise only be permitted to
the extent that they are limited to materials and activities
over which the NRC may discontinue authority and to the ex-
police accident reporting requirement to stand largely because it was required of all
carriers. The special report to the Rhode Island DOT was held inconsistent in part
because it singled out hazardous materials for the reporting requirement and required
the same information as that required by federal regulations. 44 Fed. Reg. at 75,572.
2 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(b)(3) (Supp. 1979).
2 See notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the NRC's ju-
risdiction under § 274(c)(1).
214 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(d)(2) (Supp. 1979).
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tent the regulation undertaken is pursuant to a section 274
agreement. In any event, a multiplicity of such regulations
could be shown to frustrate the purposes of the Act-a point
discussed in Pacific Legal Foundation.
In examining whether state laws are compatible with
NRC rules, what consideration of the DOT regulations is ap-
propriate? The NRC has agreed that the DOT should assume
the major role in establishing many transport operation regu-
lations, while the NRC regulates primarily packaging and de-
sign specifications. Many regulations potentially within the
NRC's jurisdiction, such as routing rules, are not promulgated
specifically by the NRC, with the recent exception of the new
rule applying to spent fuel.
In view of the affirmative agreement to coordinate regula-
tory jurisdiction expressed in the joint Memorandum of Un-
derstanding," ' a court might take such DOT rules into consid-
eration in examining a state law, particularly since the NRC
criteria for state regulation of transportation require the state
to maintain compatibility with regulations of other federal
agencies governing the field, including the DOT.216 Hence,
routing or other similar regulations imposed by an agreement
state might, in the future, be compared to any rules promul-
gated by the DOT in its upcoming routing rulemaking27 in ex-
amining "compatibility" under section 274.
Where no applicable rule or regulation exists at the fed-
eral level, the state would be prohibited from imposing a simi-
lar state requirement. It is suggested that the analysis in
ARCO"1 8 and under the HMTA,1 which inquires whether
there exists an applicable federal "requirement," is inappro-
2,5 See notes 78-80 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the Memoran-
dum of Understanding.
2,, Criteria for Guidance of States and the AEC in the Discontinuance of AEC
Regulatory Authority over Byproduct, Source and Special Nuclear Materials in Quan-
tities Not Sufficient to Form a Critical Mass and the Assumption Thereof by States
Through Agreement, 26 Fed. Reg. 2536 (1961) as amended, 30 Fed. Reg. 15,044 (1965),
1 Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 19,101, § 10.
2,7 See notes 157-58 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the DOT's
proposed rule regarding routing guidelines for placarded radioactive materials.
"I Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). See also notes 118-29 supra
and accompanying text for discussion of the ARCO decision.
219 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (1976).
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priate under the Atomic Energy Act because the scope of pre-
emption under that Act is broader and stronger than under
the PWSA or the HMTA. To the extent that the pervasive
federal regulation of the NRC (or derivatively, the DOT) does
not address a particular transportation rule, the state may not
enact a similar one designed to protect against radiation
hazards. Finally, it should be noted that even state enforce-
ment of a state regulatory scheme identical to the federal
scheme is probably impermissible to the extent such laws
cover subjects over which the NRC cannot surrender control.
With regard to localities, these subjurisdictions are pro-
hibited from imposing any regulations on the transportation of
radioactive materials for any radiation protection purposes
whatsoever.22 Section 274 permits discontinuance of NRC au-
thority and transfer thereof only to states, not to subdivisions
of the state. This conclusion was recently confirmed in United
States v. New York."' Noting that New York State had in
fact executed a section 274 agreement with the NRC, the
court cautioned: "[T]he agreement is with the State, not the
City, and section 274 of the Act makes no provision for the
ceding of any regulatory authority to entities other than the
states."2
As this article went to press an action had been instituted
that may for the first time decide on the merits a federal case
involving a ban on transport of nuclear materials. In Chem-
Nuclear Systems, Inc. v. City of Missoula,2 2 a carrier sought
relief against a Missoula, Montana ordinance banning
transportation of most radioactive materials through its
borders. Missoula is located on a major route to a low level
waste disposal site. On March 7, 1980, a temporary restraining
order was granted, prohibiting enforcement of the ordinance.
The plaintiffs argued that the ordinance is invalid under the
commerce clause and the Atomic Energy Act. The case has been
set for a hearing on a preliminary injunction.
"I See, e.g., Boswell v. City of Long Beach (L.A. Sup. Ct. March 21, 1960), re-
ported in Atomic Energy Reporter at 1 CCH 41,045 (holding City of Long Beach
preempted from regulating collection and disposal of radioactive materials).
221 463 F. Supp. 604 (1978).
2 Id. at 612.
= CV 80-18-M (D. Mont. March 7, 1980).
1979-80]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
CONCLUSION
The transportation of radioactive materials requires uni-
form nationwide regulation, except in rather limited circum-
stances. This conclusion has been the demonstrated intent of
Congress with its abundant activity in the field. Although
states and localities traditionally enjoy a broad range of au-
thority to regulate transportation through their borders under
constitutionally protected police powers, such locally-based
concerns must recognize the crucial need for uniformity in the
field of nuclear technology and its related transportation. 24
Commerce clause principles, while of some relevance
under section 112 of the HMTA, may be somewhat superflu-
ous, due to the comprehensive affirmative regulation by Con-
gress of radioactive materials transport. It appears most plau-
sible that outright bans on such activities are preempted
pursuant to the supremacy clause under both the HMTA and
the Atomic Energy Act. Other less drastic forms of regulation
may not in all cases be preempted under the HMTA, and the
outcome would depend upon application of the principles
enunciated in section 112 to the circumstances of the case.
Any regulation that might be allowed under the HMTA,
however, would have to be reexamined under the stricter
preemptive effect of the Atomic Energy Act, which confers upon
the NRC exclusive jurisdiction over the field vis-a-vis the state
and localities. While a limited range of regulation might be
undertaken by the states pursuant to section 274 of that Act,
localities would appear to be entirely foreclosed from regulation
aimed at protection from radiation hazards associated with the
transportation of radioactive materials. Moreover, the majority
of laws enacted today at the statewide level probably are far
outside the limits that are established, or could be established,
pursuant to section 274.
In this regard, however, states and localities are not
ignored. Localities should be urged first to establish a
coordinated method for assuring statewide awareness of
2' The Attorney General of California in Opinion No. 79-602, issued Aug. 24, 1979,
recognized that California cannot under present California and Federal law prohibit the
transportation of radioactive materials within the boundaries of a city.
[Vol. 68
1979-801 TRANSPORTING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 299
regulatory needs. In turn, states should make every effort to
coordinate with the federal government to assure that the
federally-administered program is responsive and sensitive to
particularized state and local needs and exigencies. Such a
"pyramid"-type structure will maintain rational uniformity of
regulation in an area where it is clearly required, as well as
fulfill the goals and policies of a federalist system.

